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Abstract. This paper studies n-player games where players beliefs about
their opponents behaviour are capacities (fuzzy measures, non-additive prob-
abilities). The concept of an equilibrium under uncertainty was introduced
by J.Dow and S.Werlang (1994) for two players and was extended to n-player
games by J.Eichberger and D.Kelsey (2000). Expected utility (payoff function)
was expressed by Choquet integral. The concept of an equilibrium under un-
certainty with expected utility expressed by Sugeno integral were considered
by T.Radul (2018). We consider in this paper an equilibrium with expected
utility expressed by fuzzy integral generated by a continuous t-norm which is
a natural generalization of Sugeno integral.
1. Introduction
The classical Nash equilibrium theory is based on fixed point theory and was
developed in frames of linear convexity. The mixed strategies of a player are prob-
ability (additive) measures on a set of pure strategies. But an interest to Nash
equilibria in more general frames is rapidly growing in last decades. For instance,
Aliprantis, Florenzano and Tourky [1] work in ordered topological vector spaces,
Luo [19] in topological semilattices, Vives [30] in complete lattices. Briec and Hor-
vath [3] proved existence of Nash equilibrium point for B-convexity and MaxPlus
convexity.
We can use additive measures only when we know precisely probabilities of all
events considered in a game. However, it is not a case in many modern economic
models. The decision theory under uncertainty considers a model when proba-
bilities of states are either not known or imprecisely specified. Gilboa [14] and
Schmeidler [27] axiomatized expectations expressed by Choquet integrals attached
to non-additive measures called capacities (fuzzy measures), as a formal approach
to decision-making under uncertainty. Dow and Werlang [6] used this approach for
two players game where belief of each player about a choice of the strategy by the
other player is a capacity. They introduced some equilibrium notion for such games
and proved its existence. This result was extended onto games with arbitrary finite
number of players in [11]. Another interesting approach to the games in convex
capacities with pay-off functions expressed by Choquet integrals can be find in [20].
An alternative to so-called Choquet expected utility model is the qualitative
decision theory. The corresponding expected utility is expressed by Sugeno integral.
This approach was widely studied in the last decade ([8],[9],[5],[26]). Sugeno integral
chooses a median value of utilities which is qualitative counterpart of the averaging
operation by Choquet integral.
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The equilibrium notion from [6] and [11] for a game with expected payoff function
defined by Sugeno integral was considered in [24]. The sets of pure strategies are
arbitrarily compacta. Let us remark that in [6] and [11] attention was restricted
to convex capacities which play an important role in Choquet expected utility
theory. There are two important classes of capacities in the qualitative decision
theory, namely possibility and necessity capacities which describe optimistic and
pessimistic criteria [8]. The existence of equilibrium expressed by possibility (or
necessity) capacities is proved in [24]. Since the spaces of possibility and necessity
capacities have no natural linear convex structure, some non-linear convexity was
used.
Let us remark that the equilibrium notion from [6] supposed that players are al-
lowed to form non-additive beliefs about opponent’s decision and answer with pure
strategies. Another approach was considered [18] and [15] for games with Choquet
payoff where players are allowed to form non-additive beliefs about opponent’s de-
cision but also to play their mixed non-additive strategies expressed by capacities.
The same approach for games with Sugeno payoff was considered in [23]. Games
with strategies expressed by possibility capacities were recently considered by Hosni
and Marchioni [16]. They considered payoff functions represented by Choquet in-
tegral and Sugeno integral. Games with expected payoff functions represented by
fuzzy integrals generated by the maximum operation and some continuous triangu-
lar norm (a partial case is the Sugeno integral which is generated by the maximum
and the minimum operations) were considered in [25].
We consider the equilibrium notion from [6] with beliefs expressed by possibility
(or necessity) capacities and payoff functions represented by fuzzy integrals in this
paper. We prove existence of such equilibrium.
2. Games with non-additive beliefs
By compactum we mean a compact Hausdorff space. In what follows, all spaces
are assumed to be compacta except for R and maps are assumed to be continuous.
Let A be a subset of X . By ClA we denote the closure of A in X . By F(X) we
denote the family of all closed subsets of X .
We need the definition of capacity on a compactum X . We follow a terminology
of [21]. A function ν : F(X)→ [0, 1] is called an upper-semicontinuous capacity on
X if the three following properties hold for each closed subsets F and G of X :
1. ν(X) = 1, ν(∅) = 0,
2. if F ⊂ G, then ν(F ) ≤ ν(G),
3. if ν(F ) < a, then there exists an open set O ⊃ F such that ν(B) < a for each
compactum B ⊂ O.
If F is a one-point set we use a simpler notation ν(a) instead ν({a}). A capacity ν
is extended in [21] to all open subsets U ⊂ X by the formula ν(U) = sup{ν(K) | K
is a closed subset of X such that K ⊂ U}.
It was proved in [21] that the space MX of all upper-semicontinuous capacities
on a compactum X is a compactum as well, if a topology on MX is defined by
a subbase that consists of all sets of the form O−(F, a) = {c ∈ MX | c(F ) < a},
where F is a closed subset of X , a ∈ [0, 1], and O+(U, a) = {c ∈ MX | c(U) > a},
where U is an open subset of X , a ∈ [0, 1]. Since all capacities we consider here are
upper-semicontinuous, in the following we call elements of MX simply capacities.
A capacity ν ∈MX for a compactum X is called a necessity (possibility) capac-
ity if for each family {At}t∈T of closed subsets of X (such that
⋃
t∈T At is a closed
subset of X) we have ν(
⋂
t∈T At) = inft∈T ν(At) (ν(
⋃
t∈T At) = supt∈T ν(At)).
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(See [31] for more details.) We denote by M∩X (M∪X) a subspace of MX con-
sisting of all necessity (possibility) capacities. Since X is compact and ν is upper-
semicontinuous, ν ∈ M∩X iff ν satisfy the simpler requirement that ν(A ∩ B) =
min{ν(A), ν(B)}.
If ν is a capacity on a compactum X , then the function κX(ν), that is defined
on the family F(X) by the formula κX(ν)(F ) = 1 − ν(X \ F ), is a capacity as
well. It is called the dual capacity (or conjugate capacity ) to ν. The mapping
κX : MX → MX is a homeomorphism and an involution [21]. Moreover, ν is a
necessity capacity if and only if κX(ν) is a possibility capacity. This implies in
particular that ν ∈ M∪X iff ν satisfy the simpler requirement that ν(A ∪ B) =
max{ν(A), ν(B)}. It is easy to check that M∩X and M∪X are closed subsets of
MX .
For each capacity ν we consider an upper semicontinuous function [ν] : X → [0, 1]
that sends each x ∈ X to ν(x). Observe that for a possibility capacity ν ∈ M∪X
and a closed set F ⊂ X we have ν(F ) = max{ν(x)|x ∈ F}, and ν is completely
determined by its values on singletons. It means that ν is completely determined
by the function [ν]. Conversely, each upper semicontinuous function f : X → I
with max f = 1 determines a possibility capacity (f) ∈ M∪X by the formula
(f)(F ) = max{f(x)|x ∈ F}, for a closed subset F of X .
For a continuous map of compacta f : X → Y we define the map Mf : MX →
MY by the formula Mf(ν)(A) = ν(f−1(A)) where ν ∈ MX and A ∈ F(Y ). The
map Mf is continuous. In fact, this extension of the construction M defines the
capacity functor in the category of compacta and continuous maps. The categorical
technics are very useful for investigation of capacities on compacta (see [21] for more
details). We try to avoid the formalism of category theory in this paper, but we
follow the main ideas of such approach.
3. Tensor products of capacities
For a continuous map of compacta f : X → Y we define the map Mf : MX →
MY by the formula Mf(ν)(A) = ν(f−1(A)) where ν ∈ MX and A ∈ F(Y ). The
map Mf is continuous. In fact, this extension of the construction M defines the
capacity functor in the category of compacta and continuous maps. The categorical
technics are very useful for investigation of capacities on compacta (see [21] for more
details). We try to avoid the formalism of category theory in this paper, but we
follow the main ideas of such approach.
The tensor product operation of probability measures is well known and very
useful partially for investigation of the spaces of probability measures on compacta
(see for example Chapter 8 from [12]). General categorical definition of tensor
product for any functor was given in [2]. Applying this definition to the capacity
functor we obtain that a tensor product of capacities on compacta X1 and X2 is a
continuous map
⊗ :MX1 ×MX2 →M(X1 ×X2)
such that for each i ∈ {1, 2} we have M(pi) ◦ ⊗ = pri where pi : X1 ×X2 → Xi,
pri :MX1 ×MX2 →MXi are the corresponding projections.
A tensor product for capacities was introduced in [18]. This definition is based on
the capacity monad structure. An explicit formula for evaluating tensor product
of capacities was given in [24] omitting the formalism of category theory. For
µ1 ∈MX1, µ2 ∈MX2 and B ∈ F(X1 ×X2) we put
µ1 ⊗ µ2(B) = max{t ∈ [0, 1] | µ1({x ∈ X1 | µ2(p2(({x} ×X2) ∩B)) ≥ t}) ≥ t}.
The problem of multiplication of capacities was deeply considered in the possi-
bility theory and its application to the game theory and the decision making theory
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where the term joint possibility distribution is used. A standard choice of a joint
possibility distribution is based on the minimum operation (see for example [16]).
For µ1 ∈M∪X1, µ2 ∈M∪X2 and (x, y) ∈ X1 ×X2 we put
[µ1 ⊗ µ2](x, y) = [µ1](x) ∧ [µ2](y).
(Let us remind that by [ν] we denote the density of a possibility capacity ν.) The
coincidence of both definitions is proved in [25]. So, the difference is only in terms.
It is also shown in [25] that the notion of tensor product coincides with the method
of aggregation of capacities considered in [7].
A more general approach is also used where the minimum operation is changed
by any t-norm (see for example [10]). We will use this definition in our paper but
we prefer the term tensor product.
Remind that triangular norm ∗ is a binary operation on the closed unit interval
[0, 1] which is associative, commutative, monotone and s ∗ 1 = s for each s ∈ [0, 1]
[17]. We consider only continuous t-norms in this paper.
So, we fix a continuous t-norm ∗ and consider a tensor product ⊛ : M∪X1 ×
M∪X2 →M∪(X1×X2) generated by ∗ defined as follows. For possibility capacities
µ1 ∈M∪X1, µ2 ∈M∪X2 and (x, y) ∈ X1 ×X2 we put
[µ1 ⊛ µ2](x, y) = [µ1](x) ∗ [µ2](y).
We also can generalize the above mentioned formula from [24]. For capacities
µ1 ∈MX1, µ2 ∈MX2 and B ∈ F(X1 ×X2) we put
µ1⊛˜µ2(B) = sup{t ∈ [0, 1] | µ1({x ∈ X1 | µ2(p2(({x} ×X2) ∩B)) ≥ t}) ∗ t}.
It was shown in [25] that both definitions coincide in the class of possibility capac-
ities.
It was noticed in [18] that we can extend the definition of tensor product to
any finite number of factors by induction. It is also true for the tensor product
generated by a continuous norm.
Lemma 1. The map ⊛˜ : M(X1)×· · ·×M(Xn)→M(X1×· · ·×Xn) is continuous.
Lemma 2. Let Xi be a compactum, Ai ∈ F(Xi) and µi ∈MXi such that µi(Xi \
Ai) = 0 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then ⊛˜
n
i=1µi(
∏n
i=1Xi \
∏n
i=1Ai) = 0.
Proof. Consider the case n = 2. Let B any compact subset of (X1×X2)\(A1×A2).
For any t > 0 consider the set Kt = {x ∈ X1 | µ2(p2(({x} × X2) ∩ B)) ≥ t}. If
x ∈ A1, then p2(({x} ×X2) ∩B) ⊂ X2 \A2, hence x /∈ Kt. Thus Kt ⊂ X \A1 and
we obtain µ1⊛˜µ2(B) = 0.
The general case could be obtained by induction. 
4. Equilibrium under uncertainty with fuzzy payoff
Let us describe the fuzzy integral generated by a continuous t-norm ∗ with
respect to a capacity µ ∈ MX . Such integrals are called t-normed integrals and
were studied in [32], [33], [28] and [25]. Denote ϕt = ϕ
−1([t,+∞)) for each ϕ ∈
C(X, [0, 1]) and t ∈ [0, 1]. For a continuous t-norm ∗ and a function f ∈ C(X, [0, 1])
the corresponding t-normed integral is defined by the formula∫ ∨∗
X
fdµ = max{µ(ft) ∗ t | t ∈ [0, 1]}.
Let us remark that existence of maximum in the previous definition follows from
the semicontinuity of the capacity µ. If we consider a partial case when t-norm is
the minimum operation, we obtain the Sugeno integral.
Now, we are going to introduce notion of equilibrium under uncertainty for games
where belief of each player about a choice of the strategy by the other player is a
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capacity. We follow definitions and denotation from [11] with the only difference
that we use the t-normed integral for expected payoff instead the Choquet integral.
Our approach is a generalization of [24] where expected payoff was expressed by
the Sugeno integral.
We consider a n-players game p : X =
∏n
i=1Xi → [0, 1]
n with compact Haus-
dorff spaces of strategies Xi. We assume that the function p is continuous. The
coordinate function pi : X → [0, 1] we call payoff function of i-th player. For
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we denote by X−i =
∏
j 6=iXj the set of strategy combinations which
players other than i could choose. For x ∈ X the corresponding point in X−i we
denote by x−i. In contrast to standard game theory, beliefs of i-th player about
opponents behaviour are represented by non-additive measures (or capacities) on
X−i.
Let ∗ be a continuous t-norm. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we consider the expected payoff
function Pi : Xi ×MX−i → [0, 1] defined as follows Pi(xi, ν) =
∫ ∨∗
X
−i
pxii dν where
the function pxii : X−i → [0, 1] is defined by the formula p
xi
i (x−i) = pi(xi, x−i),
xi ∈ Xi and ν ∈MX−i.
We are going to prove continuity of Pi. We will need some notations and a
technical lemma from [24]. Let f : X × Y → [0, 1] be a function. Consider any
x ∈ X and t ∈ [0, 1]. Denote fx≤t = {y ∈ Y | f(x, y) ≤ t}. We also will use
analogous notations fx≥t, f
x
<t and f
x
>t. Let us remark that we already used the
shorter notation ft = f
x
≥t for the case when X = {x}.
Lemma 3. [24] Let f : X × Y → [0, 1] be a continuous function on the product
X×Y of compacta X and Y . Then for each x ∈ X, t ∈ [0, 1] and δ > 0 there exists
an open neighborhood O of x such that fz≤t ⊂ f
x
<t+δ (f
z
≥t ⊂ f
x
>t−δ) for each z ∈ O.
Lemma 4. The map Pi is continuous.
Proof. Consider any x ∈ Xi and ν0 ∈MX−i and put Pi(x, ν0) = s ∈ [0, 1]. Denote
f = pi. Consider any δ > 0. Since t-norm ∗ is uniformly continuous, we can choose
ε > 0 such that |r ∗ l−p∗ t| < δ/4 for each r, l, p, t ∈ [0, 1] such that |r−p| < ε and
|l − t| < ε. Choose n ∈ N such that 1/n ≤ ε and put ti = i/n for i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
By Lemma 3 applied to the continuous function f : Xi × X−i → [0, 1] we can
choose a neighborhood O1 of x such that for each z ∈ O1 we have f
z
≥ti
⊂ fx≥ti−1
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Put V1 = {ν ∈ M(X−i) | ν(fx≥ti) < ν0(f
x
≥ti
) + ε} for each
i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, then V1 is a neighborhood of ν0.
Consider any (z, ν) ∈ O1× V1 and t ∈ [0, 1]. Choose i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} such that
t ∈ [ti, ti+1]. Since ti ≤ t and |ti − t| < ε, we have ν(fz≥t) ∗ t ≤ ν(f
z
≥ti
) ∗ ti + δ/4.
If i = 0, we have ν(fz≥t) ∗ t < δ/4 ≤ s+ δ/4.
Consider the case when i > 0. Since z ∈ O1 and ∗ is monotone, we have
ν(fz≥ti) ∗ ti + δ/4 ≤ ν(f
x
≥ti−1
) ∗ ti−1 + δ/4.
If ν(fx≥ti−1) ≤ ν0(f
x
≥ti−1
), we have ν(fx≥ti−1)∗ti−1+δ/4 ≤ ν0(f
x
≥ti−1
)∗ti−1+δ/4 ≤
s+ δ/4.
If ν(fx≥ti−1) > ν0(f
x
≥ti−1
), we have |ν(fx≥ti−1)−ν0(f
x
≥ti−1
)|, because ν ∈ V1. Then
we obtain ν(fx≥ti−1) ∗ ti−1 + δ/4 ≤ ν0(f
x
≥ti−1
) ∗ ti−1 + δ/2 ≤ s+ δ/2.
Therefore we have ν(fz≥t) ∗ t ≤ s+ δ/2 for each t ∈ [0, 1]. Hence Pi(z, ν) < s+ δ
for each (z, ν) ∈ O1 × V1.
Choose d ∈ [0, 1] such that ν0(fx≤d) ∗ d = max{µ(f
x
≤t) ∗ t | t ∈ [0, 1]} = s.
By Lemma 3 there exists a neighborhood O2 of x such that for each z ∈ O2 we
have fz≤d− ε
2
⊂ fx<d− ε
4
. Put V2 = {ν ∈ M(X−i) | ν(fx≥d) > ν0(f
x
≥d)− ε}, then V2 is
a neighborhood of ν0.
Then for each (z, ν) ∈ O2×V2 we have ν(fz≥d− ε
2
) ≥ ν(fz>d− ε
2
) = ν(X−i\fz≤d− ε
2
) ≥
ν(X−i \ fx<d− ε
4
) = ν(fx≥d− ε
4
) ≥ ν(fx≥d) > ν0(f
x
≥d)− ε.
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If ν(fz≥d− ε
2
) ≥ ν0(fx≥d), then ν(f
z
≥d− ε
2
) ∗ (d− ε
2
) ≥ ν0(fx≥d) ∗ (d−
ε
2
) > s− δ/4.
Consider the case ν(fz≥d− ε
2
) < ν0(f
x
≥d). We also have ν(f
z
≥d− ε
2
) > ν0(f
x
≥d) − ε.
Hence ν(fz≥d− ε
2
) ∗ (d − ε
2
) > s − δ/4. So, we obtain that Pi(z, ν) > s − δ for each
(z, ν) ∈ O2 × V2 and the map Pi is continuous.

For νi ∈M(X−i) denote by
Ri(νi) = {x ∈ Xi | Pi(x, νi) = max{Pi(z, νi) | z ∈ Xi}}
the best response correspondence of player i given belief νi. The set Ri(νi) is well
defined and compact by Lemma 4.
A belief system (ν1, . . . , νn), where νi ∈M(X−i), is called an equilibrium under
uncertainty with fuzzy payoff if for all i we have νi(X−i \
∏
j 6=iRj(νj)) = 0.
The main goal of this paper is to prove the existence of such equilibrium where
corresponding belief system consist of possibility measures. Since the space M∪X
has no natural linear convex structure, we will use some another natural convexity
structure on the space of capacities described in the next section.
5. A convexity on the space of capacities
Consider a compactum X . There exists a natural lattice structure on MX
defined as follows ν∨µ(A) = max{ν(A), µ(A)} and ν∧µ(A) = min{ν(A), µ(A)} for
each closed subset A ⊂ X and ν, µ ∈MX (see for instance Theorem 7.1 in [4]).The
lattice MX has a greatest element and a a least element defined as µ1X(A) = 1 for
each A 6= ∅, µ1X(∅) = 0 and µ0X(A) = 0 for each A 6= X , µ0X(X) = 1.
Following [34] we call a family C ⊂ F(X) a convexity on a compactum X if C is
stable for intersection and contains X and the empty set. Elements of C are called
C-convex (or simply convex). Let us remark that this definition is different from the
definition of convexity in [29] where the abstract convexity theory is covered from
the axioms to applications in different areas. We consider here only closed convex
sets and we do not consider the condition that union of each nested subfamily of C
is in C. In fact considered in this paper convexities have such property, but we do
not need it for our purposes. So, we use the simpler definition from [34].
A convexity C on X is called T4 (normal) if for each disjoint C1, C2 ∈ C there
exist S1, S2 ∈ C such that S1 ∪ S2 = X , C1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and C2 ∩ S1 = ∅.
The main goal of this section is to choose an appropriate normal convexity on
the compactum M∪X . There is no natural linear structure on M∪X , so, we can
not use classical linear convexity. The idempotent max-plus convexity on the space
of homogeneous possibility (or necessity) capacities was considered in [13]. Since
we deal with fuzzy integrals defined by the maximum operation and a t-norm ∗, it
seems to be natural to consider the idempotent max-∗ convexity. But we do not
know if such convexity is normal. So, we consider here a coarser convexity onM∪X
used in [24] which follows from a general categorical approach developed in [22] and
[23].
For ν, µ ∈ MX we denote [ν, µ] = {α ∈ MX | ν ∧ µ ≤ α ≤ ν ∨ µ}. It is easy
to see that [ν, µ] is a closed subset of MX . We consider on the compactum M∪X
the convexity C∪X = {C ∩M∪X | C ∈ CX}. It is easy to see that a closed subset
A of M∪X belongs to the family C∪X if and only if [
∧
A,
∨
A]∩M∪X = A. Let us
remark that
∨
A ∈M∪X but we can not state it about
∧
A.
The following lemma was proved in [24].
Lemma 5. [24] The convexity CX is normal.
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6. The main result
By a multimap (set-valued map) of a set X into a set Y we mean a map F :
X → 2Y . We use the notation F : X ⊸ Y . If X and Y are topological spaces, then
a multimap F : X ⊸ Y is called upper semi-continuous (USC) provided for each
open set O ⊂ Y the set {x ∈ X | F (x) ⊂ O} is open in X . It is well-known that
a multimap between compacta X and Y with closed values is USC iff its graph is
closed in X × Y .
Let F : X ⊸ X be a multimap. We say that a point x ∈ X is a fixed point of F
if x ∈ F (x). The following counterpart of Kakutani theorem for abstract convexity
is a partial case of Theorem 3 from [34].
Theorem 1. [34] Let C be a normal convexity on a compactum X such that all
convex sets are connected and F : X ⊸ X is a USC multimap with values in C\{∅}.
Then F has a fixed point.
The convexity C∪X is normal. We need also connectedness to apply the previous
theorem. A stronger statement was proved in [24].
Lemma 6. [24] Each element of the convexity C∪X is path connected.
We use definitions and notations from Section 4. The following theorem is a
generalization of Theorem 3 from [24] and arguments in the proofs are the same.
But, for sake of completeness we give here a complete proof.
Theorem 2. There exists (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈M∪(X1)×· · ·×M∪(Xn) such that (µ∗1, . . . ,
µ∗n) is an equilibrium under uncertainty with fuzzy payoff, where µ
∗
i = ⊗j 6=iµj.
Proof. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} consider a multimap γi :
∏n
j=1M∪(Xj)⊸ M∪(Xi)
defined as follows γi(µ1, . . . µn) = {µ ∈ M∪(Xi) | µ(Xi \ Ri(µ∗i )) = 0}. It follows
from the definition of topology on M∪(Xi) that γi(µ1, . . . µn) is a closed subset
of M∪(Xi) for each (µ1, . . . µn) ∈
∏n
j=1M∪(Xj). Consider ν ∈ M∪(Xi) defined
as follows ν(A) = 1 if A ∩ Ri(µ∗i ) 6= ∅ and ν(A) = 0 otherwise. Then we have
γi(µ1, . . . µn) = [µXi0, ν] ∩M∪(Xi), hence γi(µ1, . . . µn) ∈ C∪Xi .
Define a multimap γ :
∏n
j=1M∪(Xj)⊸
∏n
j=1M∪(Xj) by the formula γ(µ1, . . . ,
µn) =
∏n
i=1 γi(µ1, . . . , µn). Let us show that γ is USC. Consider any pair (µ, ν) ∈∏n
j=1M∪(Xj)×
∏n
j=1M∪(Xj) such that ν /∈ γ(µ). Then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and a compactumK ⊂ Xi\Ri(µ
∗
i ) such that νi(K) > 0. PutOν{α ∈
∏n
j=1M(Xj) |
αi(K) > 0}. Then Oν is an open neighborhood of ν. It follows from Lemma 4 and
continuity of tensor product that there exists an open neighborhood Oµ of µ such
that for each α ∈ Oµ we have Ri(α
∗
i )∩K = ∅. Hence for each (α, β) ∈ Oµ×Oν we
have β /∈ γ(α) and γ is USC.
We consider on
∏n
j=1M∪(Xj) the family C = {
∏n
i=1 Ci | Ci ∈ C∪Xi}. It is
easy to see that C forms a normal convexity on a compactum
∏n
j=1M∪(Xj) such
that all convex sets are connected. Then by Theorem 1 γ has a fixed point µ =
(µ1, . . . µn) ∈
∏n
j=1M∪(Xj). Let us show that (µ
∗
1, . . . , µ
∗
n) is an equilibrium under
uncertainty. Consider any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then µi(Xi \ Ri(µ∗i )) = 0. We have by
Lemma 2 µ∗i (
∏
j 6=iXi \
∏
j 6=iRj(µ
∗
j )) = 0. 
We can define on M∩X a convexity C∩X = {C ∩M∩X | C ∈ CX}. The home-
omorphism κX : M∪X → M∩X is an isomorphism of convex structures C∪X and
C∩X (more precisely C ∈ C∪X iff κX(C) ∈ C∩X). Hence, using the same arguments
as before, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3. There exists (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈M∩(X1)×· · ·×M∩(Xn) such that (µ∗1, . . . ,
µ∗n) is an equilibrium under uncertainty with fuzzy payoff, where µ
∗
i = ⊗j 6=iµj.
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